

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

TS 206750/75  
Copy No. 2  
3 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Wallace D. Henderson  
Director, Indications and Warning  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: MITRE Study (Warning in Europe)

REFERENCE: Your Memo dated 5 March 1975, subject: Request for  
Comments on MITRE Study of Warning in Europe

1. In your memo, referenced above, you requested preliminary comments on the MITRE study by 4 April. You also attached a list of specific questions which were of particular interest to you. I think your questions are on the mark, but I do not feel qualified to answer them. There are some general comments, however, that I would like to make. I will also include my analysis of a part of the study in my remarks to the warning symposium to be held in DIA next week.

2. The MITRE study is a great improvement over the one on the same subject which I reviewed some months ago. It is well organized and coherent. Although I do not feel sufficiently competent to judge the specifics, I find that the approach to the problem makes a great deal of sense. One of the major contributions is the attempt to show the sequential aspect of indicators as they might occur over time.

3. I have taken the Tables ES-II and ES-III and converted them to my "decision stairway" approach in order to try to relate the events to a probability-of-war scale for illustrative purposes. I will present the resulting charts at the warning seminar next week.

CLASSIFIED BY	
EXEMPT FROM	
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:	
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)	
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON	
De Lormine	
(unless impossible, insert date or event)	

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9

**TOP SECRET**

4. The matter of US/NATO response, however, is not included in the major summary and only appears in Volume II (p. A-21). Our responses might well change the pattern of subsequent events, either toward or away from war. There should also be a related discussion of using actions as signals both ways and related potential misunderstandings. Also there should be a discussion of deception along the same lines.

5. There also should be a discussion of the time delays involved in a NATO response primarily because of the complex command and control structure.

6. I am sure we will have the opportunity to discuss these matters more fully at next week's seminar.

151  
[Redacted]  
Product Review Division

25X1

Distribution:

Copy No. 1 - Addressee  
2 - IC Registry  
3 - PRD Chrono  
4 - Area Branch Subject  
5 - TGB Chrono

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9

TOP SECRET

Addendum to Letter

Questions on MITRE Draft Report WP-10894, Dated 30 January 1975

1. Do you agree with the "must do" and "might do" designations of the candidate necessary key events? If not, what is your set of key events?
2. Considering the overall set of key events, are the estimates for the following characteristics, considering the two scenarios utilized in the study, essentially in accord with your estimates?
  - a. Beginning times for the events.
  - b. Probable extensiveness of the events for a "real" preparatory period.
  - c. General difficulty to conceal the key event.
3. Are the scenarios used sufficiently generalized to provide an adequate basis for I&W system testing?
4. Does the set of descriptions of the candidate key events in the Annexes provide a reasonably complete account of the important attributes of WP military preparations for an attack upon Central NATO? Are any important misunderstandings of the WP preparatory processes for an attack on NATO evident? Are any important candidate key events not considered? Are any important observables and associated signatures for candidate key events not designated?
5. Are the estimates of extensiveness, timing, and potential means of concealment of the observables presented for each candidate key event (in the Annexes) consistent with your knowledge of exercises and operations, and your deductive estimates of these attributes, based on available intelligence data?

Classified by TK-1  
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY Para. 58(a)  
DECLASSIFY ON: Imp det

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800050007-9